

Ed Furtek (& Kirk Stone)

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"The campaign organization was the Senator's organization writ large."

"I think you have to go back to the Senator's experience as a fighter pilot to understand his attitude toward organization. / He has no use for organization--better still, he has no interest in it. A test pilot exists outside the organization. If you'd read his biography, you know that by sniveling, he always circumvented the organization. A pilot has a good crew, but he says to them, 'you take care of it, Don't bother me with your problems. I've got a more important job to do.' In the Senate office, he let Bill White handle all organizational matters. When anyone else brought a problem to him, his attitude was 'you and Bill straighten it out.' He never knew when the organization was doing him a disservice. Bill deliberately kept everyone's responsibility unclear so that when a problem arose or someone got too powerful, he could shift responsibilities around, and reduce the threat. Bill's object was to preserve his power. The campaign was run the same way. You can't imagine the number of foul-ups, because no one knew what his responsibility was. There were tremendous conflicts in every area up and down the line."

Bill wanted to do everything and learned a lot. Bill feared it diminished his authority. Bill's signature on Senator got out of Iowa strategy meeting.

"The first thing Bill did was to hire people for the campaign at the deputy level. They were all loyal to him. Then he brought in the senior people. They found they had these dill dos working for them; and they found that whatever they did, Bill knew about it. That's the way Bill organized the Senate office. All the top legislative people came in with outside

credentials. But all the legislative correspondents were hired by Bill and were loyal to him."

"Bill wanted to do everything himself, fund raising, organization, direct mail, media. It didn't work. But I'm sure he learned a lot."

"One of the things we've done in the office is to borrow funds from the Governmental Affairs committee whenever we ran over our budget. So Bill never had to keep on budget or manage a budget or exercise control through the budget. The same with the campaign. He never established a budget and never knew what was being spend by whom and what the state of the debt was. The Senator always said that as soon as we went into debt, we would get out of the campaign. I've heard him say that 100 times. But here we are 3 million dollars in debt. That's what Bill White did to us. Now Bill has made himself the Treasurer of the committee to retire the debt. Mary Jane is the political director. Kathy Belle is a eunuch. The fund raising operation completely dictates the Senator's schedule and his politics. So Bill still runs the office from the outside. It's amazing. The debt drives the office now."

"The one curious thing that does not fit with previous Senate practice is the Senator's complete intellectual and emotional reliance on Greg. The Senator does not give his trust easily, but he completely trusted Greg, who became a powerful force in the campaign... The only explanation I have is that the Senator never had a press operation before. Bill wouldn't allow the office to have one, because it posed too much of a threat. And he kept it out by playing to Glenn's reluctance to flak the press. Greg knew how to play the press. He'd go to them and say 'how do you think this will play' or 'what do you think the Senator should say.' They would tell him; he would tell Glenn what he thought the press would say about this and so if Glenn did

such and such. And when the press did as Greg predicted, Glenn thought 'My God, he's right, he's magical.' Glenn had never known anything like that--he was always afraid of the press."

Gregg stayed out of campaign after N.H. Was with him, but didn't try to influence him then. Vento left campaign after N.H. All Senate staff went South, when that was all there was. It was during this time that Kirk told me the campaign headquarters didn't have enough staff left to create a group for a press conference (Derrick endorsement, pre-Super Tuesday) and the Senate staff had to all go over to headquarters to make a showing of spectators.

"When I got to New Hampshire I saw the mirror image of the Washington office. We had hired a lot of people we didn't know and they weren't doing a damned thing. When I took some cards--the ones, twos and threes--(one's strongly for Glenn, two's learning and three's possible) and went out door to door, I found that the one's weren't for Glenn at all. When Jerry Vento went to Iowa, he found a list of 6000 people who had volunteered to work for Glenn. We only got 3000 votes. There are plenty of other examples of organizational foul-ups. We had 26 people on the payroll in Illinois and only half of them worked."

Iowa debate - they video taped him the night before and "It was a disaster. It was so bad it was funny. But it was black humor. We spent all night looking for the silver bullet that would score the next day. We didn't find it."

Re debate - crowd "hostile" - Glenn draws only a little applause when introduced and when he answered questions. "Some of his answers weren't bad, but you could see him sink lower and lower. And he got worse and worse."

Re question he gave Hollings re vote for equality in Senate - where

Hollings ridiculed him. "We should never have suggested that question to the Senator. It was not the preferred question; and we told him not to kick a junkyard dog, that he might get bitten. He got bitten. Why he picked that question I don't know. But you have to understand one thing about the Senator. When he was in combat, he never worried about killing someone. When he was in action, he went for the kill. It's like turning an off-on switch. The hired guns didn't understand that about him, that when they sent him into combat, he wouldn't be content to make a point or jab with a joke. He wouldn't stop half way or show restraint. He would want to go for a kill."

And he agreed with me that the Metzenbaum affair and 2nd N.H. debate were examples of where he went for the kill and it worked. But I said press was being nice in 2nd N.H. debate.

When I said Glenn was an amateur he said "He's an amateur, not because of ability, but because of arrogance. I've seen him in political situations when he does just what has to be done... He thought that all he had to do was enter the race--John Glenn, the big hero--and everyone else would be blown away."

Schneiders called Mondale "a glass locomotive that will shatter when it hits the first obstacle." Glenn believed it. *Saw self as "strong"; UM as "weak" I think.*

On idea that Bill could have protected John. "Bill threw in with Keefe and Schneiders on the attack on Mondale." He agreed with me in general that White should have stood between John and the campaign organization as the spokesman for Glenn to the campaign people.

Ed thought Keefe's LA Times interview ("the stumble interview") did "the worst disservice to the Senator of anything the organization did."

"A number of people wanted him fired on the spot and he should have been. But Greg and the family would not permit it. They said it would get a bad press. The Senator kept him on. He showed a lack of personal courage." We agreed that he's very cautious.

"The other day he asked the legislative staff to make some recommendations to him about some major domestic policy initiatives he might take. That shows how naive he is, to think that he can take any serious initiatives now, at the very end of the Congress. And he's not on any committees that will allow him to take major initiatives. I intend to ask him whether he's prepared to change committees in order to do that. Governmental Affairs is a curious committee. It comes with a budget; and he might not want to give that up. He's never been interested enough in domestic issues to do that. So he's never taken initiatives in domestic policy. And he'll never give up Foreign Relations. That's his real interest. I think he'd be happier as Secretary of State than he would be as President. Maybe he'd like to be Secretary of Defense. He'd be a disaster as President."

Parenthetically, on the matter of his newsletter, when I was waiting for the interview, a young woman came in the office. She said "I worked as a volunteer in the Glenn campaign. I'm a student at American. I'd like to be put on the mailing list to keep in touch with what he's doing." Rose said "He doesn't have a mailing list. He believes his constituents should not be taxed to pay for a newsletter. If you have a specific issue you are interested in, you could write a letter." The young woman said 'thank you' and left. Rose didn't bat an eye and continued her conversation with me. It was a cold shoulder of the first rank. No question about where she worked; no expression



of 'I'm sorry.' Rose is the nicest person on earth; but she has no political savvy whatever. She might as well be working as receptionist for a corporation. Anyway--one less Glenn volunteer.

Ed - "One thing I've learned from the campaign is that you can't win a Democratic primary by attacking from the right." Kirk said the key was that Glenn never did speak to the basic Democratic constituencies.

Ed's description of the Glenn supporters as he saw them was that they were well off. He complained at some length that Glenn /never got briefings in time, and that he was often unsure as to what his positions were. When he cast the final vote, he did what he thought was the best thing politically." (It turned out to be one of the worst in terms of the Democratic primary electorate. It was responsible, in the sense of giving and in the sense RR a chance,/of appealing to a general electorate. Another good example of Glenn's thinking--on why he started late, on his insensitivity to the constraints of the nomination contest. Ed says --re the slow start--"He didn't start late. He and Bill were laying the ground work and thinking politically as far back as the tax bill of 1981." It was a deliberate political vote. And it must have killed John to have Mondale beat him over the head with it. No wonder that made him mad. It may also explain why he had so much difficulty responding to the Gramm-Latta question before the House Democratic Caucus. There he couldn't remember his substantive position.

Ed also said that John was not well briefed before the Iowa debate. "When we started to brief him, he asked such fundamental questions about his positions that we couldn't spend enough time on strategy."

It was in his discussions of the briefings that he called John "an unmanageable candidate." You couldn't tell what he'd say. "He never did memorize a 1 1/2 minute statement on each issue."

It's fascinating, in view of the great stress John places on his being "up to speed on the issues" that he really isn't all that strong on the issues--not domestic issues anyway. Hart looks like he enjoys issues. John says he does; but it doesn't appear to be a great strength of his. Perhaps, that's because he doesn't take initiatives, and never has to think things through. He can take positions; but that's different from wrestling with issues. This is more true of domestic policy than foreign policy.

Ed thinks he did get better at the tail end of the campaign--better speeches, shorter and less detail. But he thought John was "naive" to let himself be taken to Stone Mountain to be filmed in front of the relief of the confederate generals. "He was naive to its symbolism". He called John "naive" at a couple of points.

JG is not good with the intangibles of political life--from posturing to symbolism, from loyalties to flatteries. He's a child of the media who is not really comfortable with it, too.

Greg thinks Glenn should have announced later than he did--in, December or so. I think that's in his op-ed piece. Then he would have preserved the hero image and come into the campaign as the fresh face and the hero. That assumes that John's candidacy would have a very short half life and that they should have built that in. John thought he would be in "for the long haul," which assumed a very long half life--that his candidacy would look better over time. There's a fundamental difference in assumptions there. Greg's does not give John much credit as a candidate. On the other hand, it recognizes the fact that early momentum provides key lift off.

Ed says the people on the ground in Iowa decided they should quit Iowa, but that the decision never got through to Keefe or Glenn.

Kirk Stone: "Can you imagine being a speech writer for John Glenn. That would be like choreographing for Rodney Dangerfield or writing an operatic score for Yogi Berra."

Kirk Stone: "The other day there was a meeting in the office of big shots with their three piece suits, each one with a flunkey running around doing errands for him. Someone asked me what they were doing. I said, 'they're meeting to figure out ways of getting the Senator out of debt.' They asked me 'who are they?' I said 'The same people who got him into debt!'"

Kirk's story re Glenn's lack of political sense. "On election night (1982), we got the addresses and telephone numbers of all the Democratic Senators so Glenn could call them and congratulate them on their victories. But he wouldn't make the calls. I remember we had John Stennis' phone number-- Dean of the Senate, just won a great victory--and we had told Stennis' people that Glenn was going to call. But he didn't. So we had to call the Stennis people the next day to say that Senator Glenn had been unable to make the call and where could he get in touch with Senator Stennis. They said Stennis had gone on vacation with an unlisted number, but that they would give it to us since Senator Glenn wanted to call. Glenn never called him."

Ed: "I think Glenn has diminished his stature in the Senate. I know I see it on my level in dealing with other staff. They used to say how much they admired Senator Glenn. Now they don't."

Kirk thinks that same bottom line has resulted--that Glenn has lost influence. The point I guess is that losing sets you back and how you lose counts too. Glenn lost badly and didn't live up to expectations. He can recover (Muskie did, Baker did) but it depends on how he takes the loss and what he learns from it.