"Our toughest task is to convince the administration that they've got a big problem, one they haven't done beans about. All they have done so far is mouth off. People are getting pretty impatient and a little bitter about crime control. Our bill is the most hard hitting, cost free approach there is. You can't have all the task forces and all the dream bills you want, but they aren't going anywhere. Our bill will actually accomplish something. But we have to convince the administration of that."

"It's so hard to predict what will happen. When Arlen introduced the bill on Oct. first, you remember he started by saying, "Now that our economic program is in place." Well it wasn't in place and it still isn't. We spent the whole fall tied up in this budget business. And if we continue to do it--and it looks like we will because the continuing resolution runs out in February--if we're tied up with this budget craziness all spring, we may not be able to get any attention for the bill till summer, if then. Baker has such a lock on the scheduling of legislation that he has all of a sudden become an important player, just in the last few days. We've got to convince him--not about the substance of the bill, but about the public relations aspects of it, the political aspects. We had never even talked to him before. We have to get him to make our bill his priority legislation. Otherwise, we can get the bill through the subcommittee and the full committee and still never get it to the floor. We can get through two stages without him, but not the third. So it's hard to know what will happen."

What happened with Jensen's testimony. "Some of the White House operatives got nervous when they read his prepared testimony; and so they withdrew
the testimony the night before he was to testify. When we heard that, we
disinvited him, because it made no sense to have him testify if he couldn't
support the bill. His testimony was strongly supportive, but a group of
White House people read it who hadn't been involved before; and they
expressed objections to the idea of state jurisdiction being invaded by the
federal government and by the problem of overcrowding the prisons. Martin
Anderson was taken aback by the newness of the idea. He came to the problem
fresh and without any background in it. Specter is writing a letter to
him today. Stockman's Deputy at OMB was worried about the prisons. So we
have talked to him. We have to educate a wholly new group of people now.
But the original group is holding firm their support, the President the
Attorney General and Meise... Meese was most critical of the bill; and he
is strongly supportive of it. The Attorney General, despite the opposition
of some subordinates, held firm. Jensen has always been strong. There may
be some backchannel lobbying by the losers within the Justice Dept. But
aside from that Justice is no longer a problem. Our problem is at the OMB,
White House level. We have to see a new group now. I've been meeting with
lower eschelon people there and Specter has met with some of them. A lot of
paper is being passed along to them right now. We think they will come along
when they understand the bill.

"The toughest objection to overcome is the bust the prison argument.
They say, how can you be sure you won't have to many criminals that you will
have to build a new prison. That is a very expensive proposition and one
that requires a long lead time. That's the most thoughtful criticism that is
coming out of OMB. It's more than just a vague philosophical objection, and
harder to overcome. We think there will be space. Part of the idea of the
bill is to convince state judges to hand out stiffer penalties. If that
happens, as a result of two or three years of operation under this bill, then we'll have far less of a problem than anyone thinks. Also if judges let up on some sentencing—for drugs and burglary—who knows how many places might be created for people who committed more serious crimes."

Essential problem re. hearing was that the night before, new people got involved in the act and got "nervous". The Specter group has to do another educating job.

I asked Paul if he was getting any help from anyone else.

"No, until we get the administration's approval, there isn't much sense in lining up other support. We held meetings last week with the leadership on both sides of the House Judiciary Committee, and we got a good reception. We did not push for support. But Bob McLory the ranking Republican member of the committee came up afterward and said, if you want me to sponsor the bill in the House I will. He was ready to go. We told him that some glitches had occurred in the administration and we'd rather wait till those get ironed out. He agreed. What we want in the House is bipartisan support. It's the Democrats who will be in trouble. But the bill is so narrowly drawn, that I believe Rodino and Hughes will go along. In the Senate, I don't know what the Democrats will do. They have their own crime package. We have not pushed hard for any support yet; but that's what we do want, of course. When Arlen introduced the bill, he sent a letter to all members of the Committee and, later, to all members of the Senate. It did not draw much response. The only Senator who wrote back and said he wanted to be put on as a sponsor was Bentsen—so we did that. But we didn't lobby anyone for support. We could get it through the subcommittee now, probably; but in the full Committee it won't go anywhere until the Administration gives its approval. Once it does, the Committee Republicans will fall into line. The only one who won't do so
automatically is Mathias, and he is independently supportive of the bill. On
the Democratic side, it's hard to tell. We have talked with Biden, and I think
he supports the idea. The only one who has taken a spontaneous interest in
our hearings is Kennedy. You saw him there the other day; but I don't know
what that means."