tunch with Wm. Mailliard September 21, 1965 1:15 - 2:45, 90 minutes John Montey ...

Mailliard suggested lunch. We ate at the Republican Club in the Congressional. He paid. It was disappointing. There is something about an interview over lunch that makes it hard for me to keep popping questions. There's a tendency to chit chat. Your old buddy Nick was there with George Meader.

After 2 scotch sours (and 3 martinis for him) I asked about the conference committee. He said it was very simple -- impasse. "We could never bring that back to the House, they'd never pass it, everyone knew this. It was just a matter of when the Senate would give in, we all realized this and they did too. I was opposed not so much to the two years as saying that the present program was going to end. There are a lot of problems with the foreign aid program, no one denied that, but I think they have been doing a better job and if there's anything that would be bad for morale it's saying the program ends at such and such a time."

According to R the conference was cut and dried. There was no room for compromise on the basic points of a 2 year bill and ending the program. "Doc wouldn't accept a two year authorization. It would mean he couldn't keep up bogged down every year on foreign aid, listening to testimony that is a rehash year after year. The subcommittees might start doing something, God knows there's enough we should be doing, and Doc isn't about to cut the subcommittees lease. He wouldn't be able to keep up tied down with foreign aid, and that's the only thing we do now. It would cut our work in half and we might start moving in other directions. Doc doesn't want this. He likes his peace and quiet."

R feels that Fulbright et al knew the House would not budge and that Fulbright just drew it out so he would not be accused of giving in too quickly by Morse and others. "I finally started to needle him a little. I said why stand up for Morse who doesn't even bother to come to the meetings. Piss on him. Fulbright just drawled 'I think we'd better meet next week.' It was merely a question of when the Senate would give in."

I asked if it ever got acrimonious and R said no, it was a simple impasse and everyone knew what the outcome would be. I asked about attendance and R said it was good on the House side, almost everyone attended every meeting, but Fulbright was about the only Senator faithful in attendance. Mansfield was there once. Morse came in to make his speech. Sparkman wasn't around much. Hickenlooper came more than Aiken. Fulbright chaired it -- "I don't know why but he always does."

R said they completed action on all of the other differences in the 2 bills quickly, and that the rest of the conference was hung up on the major disagreements. R feels that the Administration did not really care too much about getting the 2 year authorization.

R complained again about the lack of attention Doc-pays to him. R said Doc has the votes now and does not need Republicans like himself and hasn't

given them a fair shake. "I used to be able to get an amendment through, in fact I rarely lost -- sensible amendments, not crazy things -- but this year I had to threaten to oppose the bill on the floor before I got my amendment adopted. I told Doc that he doesn't need me now but someday he might." The Republicans have no influence. R said they can sometimes get Zablocki, Burleson, Kelly, Hays, Selden, O'Hara, Fountain, and Fascell but Doc has all the rest in his pocket. The new members vote with Doc all the time. R said again that FA doesn't do enough things, isn't too influential -- "I think the thing that must always be kept in mind is that foreign affairs is the executive's responsibility. Oh you can direct him a little, have some influence, but in the end he's going to do what he wants whatever you say."

R said "It wouldn't be any different under Zablocki, Clem's a hell of a nice guy, I like him, but he's thick."

R has been on 3 conferences but had no comparisons to make, other than this one reached an impasse. I asked why Adair didn't sign the conference report and R said "He never does, he always votes against the program."

I asked R about constituent opinion, if he tries to find out what it is: "Oh yes, I try to find out how they feel, not that it's going to make much of a difference in what I do, but I like to know. I find that once you build up confidence in yourself among constituents they are willing to take an awful lot of variation in your views. Confidence is the important thing. Unless they have confidence in you you are subject to every shift in the wind." R went on to say how various groups sometimes support him, sometimes not, and he's not sure it makes any difference. He wants to know who he is going to make mad so he can defend himself, but 90% of the voters don't care about the issues.

Just for the hell of it I asked him if he'd like to go on W & M: "Hell no. Why would I want to?" I said it's attractive to some people: "Yeah, it makes them feel like big shots, well I'm not interested in that."

R said that in one month he got <u>eleven</u> invitations to the White House --bill signing, socials etc. He accepted only 2 because he feels LBJ is just putting on a show and R doesn't want to be a party to it -- when JFK invited you down he had something substantive to discuss and R went. Now he feels all these invitations are insulting and he won't be LBJ's patsy.

I asked about the review part which allowed Fulbright to save some face: "Oh we offered them that at the very beginning. Reviews don't mean anything, there have been lots of reviews."

I asked why, with all the dissension, they have never tried to change FA: "Oh I suppose you could stage a revolution but what good would it do?"

R said they could win a few points from Passman "But with Otto what could you do? You had to beat him. He's powerless now."