

BOB GUTTMAN

December 7, 1982

Re conference. "It made all the rest of it look easy, and that judgment was confirmed by Carl Perkins, who said it was the toughest conference he was ever on."

On the special exemption for Perkins, "Without that special exemption for Perkins, there would have been no bill. He was sitting there saying "The conference is over." It was Hatch that worked it out. As soon as Hatch offered it to him and explained it, then he and Perkins started making agreements right and left on everything else. There were some substantive issues of some importance. Hawkins didn't know what was going on. But Perkins doesn't believe in voting. The Senators all signed off on the conference. But Hawkins and the other House Democrats got up and left. They wouldn't sign. We had to explain to them. Dan had to explain the Perkins exemption to the White House and OMB."

He said 2 things interested him about the conference - how tough it was and how much the staff got involved.

"The two sets of conferees could not understand each other. They operated from such different sets of assumptions that they could not even talk to each other. Each side felt they had already given up all they could give. Hawkins felt he had given up public service employment, so how could he be expected to give anymore. For Quayle, public service employment had always been absolutely out of the question. The bills were so far apart, we could not work from the bills. The staff had to work up proposals for them to work on. That was the only way they could talk to each other. Both sides kept asking us for proposals. Quayle kept telling me...give us one proposal. Hawkins wanted a few different proposals. But

they all wanted a bill. So we kept making proposals. The main issues between House and Senate were the composition of the PIC Council and the role of the governor. That's when the Hatch proposal came in. He offered Perkins the exemption, He also resolved the 70-30 formula, which was the administration's major problem. That was the one provision on which they would have vetoed the bill. We wanted Hatch to come in with that proposal, because we knew the administration could not repudiate Hatch. He was up for reelection. He was Reagan's man. After the conference report was agreed to, all the Republicans went down to the White House to argue for the bill. It was not a negotiating session. It was an explanation session. Hatch carried the argument that 'this is it. It is this or no bill.' Angresani argued against it to the end. Meese was in New York, thank goodness. Duberstein and Baker were for it. And the final act was Stockman saying 'OK it's the best we can get.'"

"Last week I went to a Chamber of Commerce luncheon. Angresani spoke for five minutes about the job training bill, calling it the administration's bill and saying that way back last year the administration put forward its bill and that it had finally passed. I couldn't believe what I heard. Then he saw me sitting there, and he thanked Senators Hatch and Quayle for assisting with "our bill." I don't know what to say. I think he really believes it. I guess theft is the sincerest form of flattery."

"Without Dan Quayle, there would have been no job training bill." He says he tells audiences that everywhere.

Kid. V
I asked about Dan's sense of confidence. "All people who get elected to the Senate have self confidence. What I find so interesting about Dan is his humility. He doesn't need and he doesn't like the trappings of the office,

the adulation, the royalty of it all. He doesn't need the constant protection of the staff. He wants to be briefed; but then he'll go out on the floor or in committee and handle it honorably. If he makes a mistake the world can't come to an end. That's his feeling about it."

Perkins
I recall that yesterday when we got back to the office building in the big Senate limo, he said "I hate riding in that big limousine. Sometimes I tell them to let me off 3 blocks away so I can walk where I'm going. The Senate has an old beat up Dodge they use to take people around town. That's the one I like. But I always seem to get this big black turkey."

Bob said that when they were having trouble with Perkins. "We got Schmitt to call Natcher to call Perkins to tell him that if we went with CETA, the funding would be cut drastically. I don't know whether the message ever reached Perkins or whether, if it did, it had any effect."

At the conference "It was Quayle alone on the Senate side with Perkins, Hawkins, Billy Ford, Jeffords and Erlenborn on the other. Those House members have a lot of experience. But his own personal relations with the House members helped him a lot. He just kept repeating the arguments over and over.

We talked about the signing ceremony and said Dan was bitter about that. "It's the only piece of legislation I know of that had two bill signing ceremonies--one in the House and one at the White House. It's also the only televised White House signing ceremony I know of at which there were--deliberately--no members of Congress present. And not once did the President mention the name of the author of the bill. I think Dan was a little bitter about that."

"The problem was built into the bill from the first day. It was a bipartisan bill. But as time went on, partisanship became more and more to dominate. The White House never wanted Ted Kennedy in the Rose Garden."