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"Unbeliveable pain and agony" during the struggle over the consensus bill.

"The administration thought Quayle was impetuous and presumptuous. Quayle felt the administration had had its chance to get aboard and had refused."

She was the metaphor of the train. "The train left the station without the administration aboard; and it was on a very fast track!" Re Quayle proposal.

"You had two separate development tracks." Didn't come together till "marathon negotiation sessions" over a weekend till 2 or 3 in the morning between Angresani and Guttman, that produced the consensus bill.

After that, "The question became. Which bill do we mark up? They were at war, but over very silly things," i.e., what should be the number of the bill. Quayle wants 2036 and finally agrees to mark up the consensus bill, but call it 2036. Admin hates 2036 because Kennedy is on it. "Symbolic politics."

"This bill is almost 100% of what Dan Quayle has done during his first two years in the Senate. He's got to take something back to Indiana. I'm not downplaying the bill. It's a whopping big bill. And he's worked darn hard on it. But he's got a very big stake in this bill."

After subcommittee markup. "Now the ball was in Hatch's court. The administration still opposed the bill. Hatch told Quayle. If you don't get together with the admin I'll sit on the bill forever. The admin was pleased to hear him talk this way. But at the same time, he was on the phone to Ed Meese telling him that the admin was going to have to give a little. He was basically sympathetic to Quayle's position, but

there was no way he was going to hold that markup until they worked out an agreement. He kept a low profile. He was trying to get the warring factions together, to get them around the table. He used the leverage of the markup to accomplish that. And we got the Treaty of Jobs."

They had high level meeting and agreed on a deal.

Admin tried to "stall it" to the end. "Baker called Hatch and said 'a lot of people are asking me to put a hold on this what should I do.'" Hatch said, they've had enough time. If they haven't put it together now, they never will. Hatch knew they had been stalling since the beginning. They were still stalling."

Every interest group involved - mostly during development of the bill. Later on they just held breath hoping they'd get something.

Weicker "didn't want to have it on his conscience to stop the entire bill. They told him that admin had to have 6 points.

During delay in markup "Quayle was in orbit."

When I asked her at the beginning when the thing threatened to go off the track "Once a day." she laughed.

She started her narrative in the spring of 1981. Said Bob Guttman "had been involved in the training field since this day one. He knew all the pitfalls that lay ahead." That helps to explain the fast start.

She says Guttman asked admin to work with him early on; they couldn't "they didn't have their act together;" next thing they knew he came up with a bipartisan bill. If he couldn't have the administration, then he would get Kennedy. She has a different idea of DQ's preference than I had before. She thinks DQ would have gone with admin; I thought bipartisanship was his preference.

Hatch gets Quayle to hold up his hearings till admin has a bill. In return, Donovan agrees to be lead witness.

Joint hearings "that was another thing that ticked off the admin."

"Hatch kept a low profile throughout the whole thing. He just wanted to squeeze the thing together, keep peace in the family." He wanted a smooth markup.

Now that Senate has acted, the proviso in the 1981 Reconciliation Bill is null and void - putting pressure on House.