

DAN QUAYLE

June 10, 1982

"You got a hair cut."

"Do you think we're going to get a bill" he asked. I said, "That's what I came to ask you." He laughed. "Yes, I think we'll get a bill. The administration has finally decided to support us. The White House wants the bill. If we can just get Angresani out of the country, give him something else to do. The Labor Department is in a shambles. You can get anything out of them. Morale is low. Donovan ~~is~~ is under a cloud

I don't know if he even comes to work any more. When you try to reach him, he's always over with Birch and Bat(?) meeting with his lawyers. It will be interesting to see what the strategy will be in the House. I hope we can pass our bill soon. Then we'll have a better chance of getting a substitute passed over there. Maybe the House will wait. But they aren't dummies over there. So I would expect them to move as quickly as they can to pass their own bill. That way, they get more leverage in conference. I've got to talk to Michel. But he's been so tied down with the budget that I haven't even tried. He would just tell me to come back later. I have no idea what the Republicans are thinking over there."

Later, he came back to this. "I want to get it passed in the Senate during June. If I can get a time agreement with the Democrats, Baker will schedule it. If we can't get a time agreement, I'm not sure what he will do. There are so many other bills coming up--voting rights, immigration, Dole's got a tax bill, the debt limit. I've got to talk to Kennedy. Unless there's some controversial amendments, our side could do it in 2 hours. Hopefully, Kennedy will agree to 2 hours, or 4 hours. I don't know what

they'll try on the floor. If they try to take out the wage prohibition, I'll beat them. And if they try and fail, they'll be weakened in conference. They tried Pub. Serv. Employment in the supplemental and did you see how many votes they got--14. With a time agreement, we could even schedule the bill during the voting rights filibuster, if there is going to be one. Baker is committed to the bill. I got commitments to the bill during the budget process. So I don't think we'll have any trouble passing the bill in the Senate... This must be fascinating to you."

I asked him about the White House meeting. He said there were 2 meetings with "the same players"--Baker, Stockman, Quayle, Hatch, Rubenstein, Donovan. Maybe Angresani, Turner.

First meeting was the one when I was in Dan's office - where wage prohibition had not been brought up and then the next day there's administration objection.

Re second meeting. "In both meetings, it turned out that the principals were Stockman and myself. I had the most trouble with Stockman--my friend! He was adamantly opposed to a summer youth program, and he did not like the idea of spending money on supportive services. Jim Baker wanted a bill. He's very different from Meese. When I talked to Meese, he wanted to know just what was in the bill. He was interested in its purity and didn't want any bill that wasn't pure. Baker wanted to get together to work out an agreement. That's the way you run the government. You don't run it on ideology. You don't get anywhere if you are hung up on purity. [After the first meeting] we weren't getting anywhere with Angresani. They wanted us to delay the markup again. Hatch wanted to delay it. I said to him, No, we can't do that again. We've got to go ahead. I said to myself, 'I don't

have to deal with Angresani. And so I called Jim Baker. And I said to him 'You've got to do something if you want a bill. The Labor Dep't is killing it. It's your President that will be hurt. We are going to hold a markup tomorrow. Can't we do something. Baker said that the Labor Department was their administrator, that they couldn't go around them; but he said the decision would be made in the White House. He said they would pretend to deal with the Labor Department, while really making the decision themselves. I called him at 2:30; at five o'clock we had a meeting. Donovan and Angresani (I think) we're there, but they sort of sat off to the side. That was fine with me. Donovan is very hard to bargain with. He's used to dealing those guys up in New Jersey. Stockman and I were the principals. Stockman ^{agreed} ~~read~~ to a summer program and I agreed to try to get the wage prohibition. I said I don't know if I can sell it, but I'll try. If we lose that in committee, we may stop the markup, regroup and see what we can do. I left for Atlanta. When I got there I called Kennedy and had a brief conversation. He was at dinner. I told him what had happened. I said, I hope you won't give me too much trouble tomorrow. I need this one. I hope you won't get too rambunctious. I know you are opposed, but I need some room." He said 'You'll do all right' or something like that. I called Weicker, filled him in very briefly and asked if I could come around and talk with him when I got back the next day. He said sure; and I went and explained the situation to him. He said 'If that's the best you can do, I'll be with you.' I thought I had him; but I did not know for sure that I had him. He's not the kind of person who says 'I will support whatever bill you come up with.' But I felt comfortable going in. Nobody else felt that way. And I didn't talk to anyone. The important thing was that Kennedy

did not work actively against me on the wage prohibition. They were opposed to it, but they did not lobby Weicker--or Stafford--against it. They could have made a decision that they were going to go all out to defeat the wage prohibition. They did not make that decision. What would have happened if the AFL-CIO had turned their people loose? They could have said to Weicker, 'what do you owe the administration?' He can't get any credit at home for his votes on the bill. That happens in committee. But if his labor people at home say he voted against them, then he will be hurt at home. I have no idea whether we could even have gotten a bill under those circumstances. We could have passed a bill, but it wouldn't have had administration support and Baker would have been put in a box. Weicker was the key; and he is the swing vote on the committee. I talked to the Democrats--Randolph, Eagleton, Pell--about it, but they were solid. It's amazing. When Kennedy goes, they all go with him. And Eagleton is a ^{pretty} independent person. It's not like that on our side. When Hatch goes, we are just as likely to go the other way. That's what makes it so hard for us to get anything done in the committee.

"I'm not sure why they didn't work actively against the prohibition. There is something in the bill for the unions--retraining for displaced workers. That's what I kept telling them. 'There's money for displaced workers. They are your guys. Also, Kennedy wanted a bill. He has always wanted a bill. His decision not to oppose the prohibition strongly was a good faith effort on his part. Both Kennedy and the unions may hope to strengthen their position in the House and in conference, and they knew it was this bill or nothing in the Senate. Also, the thing happened so quickly the opponents may not have had the time to react. If they had had a couple of days to think about it, they might have decided differently."

He reiterated his belief that "This is a bipartisan bill." and that "we could not have done it any other way. If Kennedy had not supported the bill, we would have had a whole lot of bills--a Hatch Bill, a Quayle bill, maybe an administration bill--and none of them would have been seen as having much of a chance of getting out of Committee. Once Kennedy supported it, everyone knew the bill could get out of committee."

"There never was a time that Kennedy threatened to close the door and withdraw his support for the bill. He wanted a bill. He got a lot of the things he wanted in his original compromise. At one point when he felt that our negotiations with the administration went against the original compromise, we gave him back three out of the four disagreements. When the administration wanted to use the consensus bill as the markup document in subcommittee, we might have had serious trouble (with Kennedy). I would have had more amendments in subcommittee to put back the original bill. That would have put Kennedy in a weaker position. The consensus bill was the one where Hatch wanted to be second on the list ahead of Kennedy. And the administration was already announcing that we were going to take up the consensus bill. They couldn't stand the thought of having Kennedy's name on the bill. I finally said, we're not going to get into this nonsense; and we went back to Quayle-Kennedy as the markup document. That is the only point where we could have lost the bipartisanship. It's a bipartisan bill. It will be known as the Quayle-Kennedy bill. In Indiana it will be known as the Quayle bill. I don't know how he will use it politically in Mass. But I've heard that he's using it with the conservatives, as an example of how he can work with conservatives and how he has helped produce a worthwhile bill. I saw him on the Brinkley show once and he mentioned it."

earlier

Indiana

Indiana credit

We talked about the "Hatch on behalf of Quayle" mode. He said there had been a subcommittee chairman tradition. But Hatch had the voting rights bill taken away from him by Thurmond and he decided he could do it. "It's his staff that were the problem. I heard from someone that at one point they decided to call it the Hatch Bill. They decided he should take political credit at home for passing this great piece of legislation. Not having done a god damned thing on it, they decided it was time for him to step forward and put his name on it. I just heard that. But it sounds like something ~~Pitts~~ ^{Pitts} ~~Pitts~~ and that bunch of clowns over there would do. They are a very strange group."

Ind

Will the label hurt him? "The only people who will ever know who reported the bill are Supreme Court justices trying to interpret legislative intentions. That won't make any difference. It's my bill." He seems genuinely not to be worried about credit in this case. He just assumes he'll get it, I think. I said it would be newspapers that would decide what to call it. And he said he guessed I was right. But he does not rise in righteous wrath over the outcome. He showed a certain dislike for Hatch. But he's not at war with Hatch. He's got too much else going.

I asked him what the effect on him was after passage. I suggested an effect on his confidence. "I've learned how difficult it is to get things done. It hasn't affected my confidence. I've always had that. But I think it increases the confidence of the staff ⁱⁿ on me. They will say, here is someone who said a year and a half ago that he was going to get a bill and he's done it. They will look upon me as someone who can get things done. As far as my peers are concerned, the reaction will be favorable, I'm sure. After the markup, several people came up and congratulated me--Kennedy, Nickles, Hawkins--she's been a strong supporter all the way through--Riegle, Metzenbaum."

I said I got the feeling that the Democrats felt some sympathy for him because they knew he was fighting the Administration, too. He reacted as if he hadn't thought of that, but said he thought that it was correct. My point is that it is not as if the admin. wrote a bill and fed it to the Chairman of the committee and the Democrats had to accept it from the Republicans. The genealogy of the bill was quite different. It came from Quayle and Kennedy and Quayle fought the administration to keep the Kennedy affiliation.

I asked him what would have happened if he had not pushed the bill and had just waited. He puzzled over it some. "I'm not sure what would have happened. Hawkins wanted to extend CETA and wait for a change of administration in 1984. But that would not have carried in the Senate. The administration might never have put in a bill. I'd like to think there would have been some responsible people over on this side. But I'm not sure who would have worked hard for it. Nobody else did. So I guess I'd have to say that, 'No.' If I had not pushed it, we probably wouldn't have had any bill. Institutionally, it was on congressional initiative. There's no doubt about that. The administration fought every step of the way."

I asked him what he said about the bill in Indiana last week. "It comes up. People are interested. I told them the bill passed. But they are much more interested in my tax simplification scheme. They are more interested in big new ideas than they are in my slogging through the mud back here trying to pass a bill."

I asked him if I could go to Indiana with him and he said sure. When I mentioned the fall, he said "I'll be helping some local candidates. But I'll be keeping a low profile. After the election, I'll pick up some, but I won't really go hard till 1985. Some people campaign all the time."

I would just burn out doing that. And I don't want to burn out."

We talked about the state of Congress. "I don't think we're going to get much done. (He ticked off bills that went down or may.) It's dead around here. Usually when I come back from recess things are very busy. Yesterday when I came back the office was nowhere near as busy as it normally is." The Senate seems to be bracing for a Helms filibuster on voting rights. Baker is in China. Stevens is in control. When I came back from the House budget fight--at 5:00 tonight, the Senate was closed up tight as a drum.

He talked about the change of meeting room. "When I found out we were going to have all those votes, I said to Hatch 'We've got to move over to the Senate. I had a hell of a time convincing him to move. He must have had a whole bunch of people from Utah in the room. Finally he agreed, but he told me to get a room large enough for 200. The only room I could get was this little one. He wanted 207, but they were having a reception there at 5:00." I said it was harder to disagree when you are so close and he agreed. But he did not pick up on the size of the room making any difference.